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The relationship between arms races and war is a critical consideration in both peace research and strategic
planning. This study reconsiders the work of Michael Wallace which has postulated that arms races
significantly increase the probability of a serious dispute escalating to war. A critique of Wallace’s coding
procedures and arms race index precedes an attempt to replicate his findings. In the replication, serious
disputes, taken from the Correlates of War Project, among major powers during the years 1816-1970 serve
as the population to be tested. Adjustments in coding and index construction from the Wallace work are
made. It was discovered that only 25% of those disputes preceded by a mutual military buildup escalated
to war, while almost 77% of the wars in this population were preceded by periods lacking armaments
competition. Controls for inter-century differences and unilateral military buildups failed to alter this
apparent lack of a relationship between arms races and dispute escalation. Differences with Wallace’s study
are analyzed and the implications for peace research discussed.
Conventional wisdom has always presupposed
a link between rapid military buildups and
war. The old dictum ’if you want peace,
prepare for war’ offers one perspective on
the inter-relationship of military spending
and the outbreak of conflict. The spiral model
is indicative of a more dangerous connection
between increasing weapons and war. Whether
the effect is deterrence or provocation, a
nation’s decision to significantly increase
its military capability could be an important
factor in the understanding of interstate
war.
Despite the central nature of military
spending in national security decision-making,
empirical researchers have generally ignored
its possible effect on the initiation of war.
This void in the academic literature noted by
Singer (1979) in 1969 remains large today.
Nevertheless, some recent efforts have ex-
tended the pioneering ideas of Richardson
(1960), studying the impact of arms races and
military spending decisions on the outbreak
of war. The most interesting work in this
area has been that of Michael Wallace. He
used early Correlates of War (COW) Project
compilations on major power military ex-
penditures and serious disputes to investigate
nation behavior in conflict generated sit-
uations. In a widely quoted article, Wallace
(1979) concluded that the presence or absence
of an arms race between two rivals correctly
predicted war/no war outcomes in over 90%
of the serious disputes studied. Those results
are summarized in Table I.
A later study by the same author (Wallace
1982), using the same data base, served to
reinforce this strong association between arms
races and war. The general paucity of alter-
native investigations makes Wallace’s studies
the most definitive to date.
If Wallace’s findings are correct, the im-
plications for policymaking on arms limitation
are clear. The START negotiations must
proceed with all deliberate speed, lest a clash
between the superpowers should escalate to
all-out war. However, certain methodological
problems cast doubt on the validity of Wal-
lace’s conclusions. It is the purpose of this
paper to detail these difficulties and retest
* An earlier version of this paper was presented
at the Annual Meeting of the International
Studies Association-South, Atlanta, 4-6 November
1982.
The author would like to thank Michael
Champion, Miroslav Nincic, Peter Wallensteen,
J. David Singer, Bradley Martin and Bruce
Russett for their comments and suggestions.
In addition, gratitude is expressed to Mary




Wallace’s ’arms races and escalation’
the military buildup-war relationship with a
modified set of assumptions and indicators.
A closer look
The Correlates of War treats multi-party
serious disputes (three or more disputants)
as one integrated dispute. Where there was
a clear informal/formal partnership among
the disputants on one side and where the
subject matter of the dispute was the same
for each partner, the dispute classification
scheme served to reflect the interconnection
of events and interests for all those involved.
Wallace chose to code each dispute participant
dyadically against those nations in opposition.
Thus, the original 1914 dispute which escalated
to World War I is analyzed as if it were six
separate disputes and consequently six indi-
vidual wars. Overall, 26 distinct wars are
created where only 7 or 8 integrated ones
occurred.’ As a result, the strength of the
arms race-war relationship stems not from an
abundance of distinct cases of dispute
escalation, but merely is a function of
a coding decision. Wallace’s (1980) response
to this problem was to re-evaluate his results
using only formal alliance patterns to combine
certain sets of disputes. This only partly
solved the difficulty of numerical inflation
of disputes and wars. The follow-up analysis
failed to consider situations which share
similar characteristics to those involving
formal alliances, but merely lack a signed
instrument between the parties.
A related problem is Wallace’s inclusion
in his population of serious disputes those
cases which were not independent of ongoing
wars. In some ways, this explains the fact
that the two World Wars account for over
80% of the explanatory capability in his study
(Weede 1980). Serious problems are inherent
in studying war-related disputes in this
context. Wallace’s purpose was to assess
whether an arms race affected the probability
of a serious dispute escalating to war. However,
in cases where one or both disputants are
involved in a war, the probability of that
war-related dispute escalating is greater
than that of a dispute independent of an
ongoing war. An inference about the effect
of an arms race on a war-related dispute
must be considered tentative at best. In
Wallace’s work, the arms race impact (if any)
on dispute escalation is indiscernible from
the effects of the ongoing war. Nevertheless,
it is these cases of war-related disputes which
enhance the confirmation of the hypothesis
that arms races lead to war.
Wallace’s results indicate the U.S.S.R.-
Japan dispute of 1945 to be an instance of
an arms race leading to the escalation of a
dispute. Yet, it is difficult to believe that
this brief war was anything but a result of
the hostilities associated with World War II.
To suggest that an arms race in the late 1930s
exercised any influence on the outbreak of
war in this dispute five years later is premature
without additional research and runs contrary
to accumulated historical opinion on the
subject.2 2
Wallace (1979:8) justifies his choice of cases
and the dyadic coding method by stating:
’In the case of those wars which involved more
than two powers, each dyad is coded separately.
Thus, for example, World War II is coded as an
initiation of Franco-German and Anglo-German
hostilities in 1939, an Anglo-Italian and Franco-
Italian outbreak in 1940 and a Russo-German and
Japanese-American conflict initiated in 1941. This
was done to avoid the practical and conceptual
difficulties of aggregating military capabilities
of nations entering the conflict at different times.’
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This explanation is open to criticism as the
disputes involving different actors in different
years are coded as separate disputes anyway
according to COW criteria. If the disputants
entered the dispute in the same year (thereby
determining the same data points for military
expenditures - the ten years prior to that year
in the Wallace study), it is irrelevant if the
disputants entered the war emanating from the
dispute at different times. Furthermore, Wal-
lace’s explanation provides no justification for
separating a dispute (such as the 1939 Poland
crisis) in which all parties entered the dispute
and the war at the same time.
Wallace’s method of determining an arms
race is not without conceptual problems. An
arms race is conventionally described as a
process involving competitive interaction,
manifested by rapid increases in military
spending and weaponry. In Wallace’s analysis,
it is only determined whether or not the
disputants are rapidly arming themselves;
there is no determination if this spending is
directed against the dispute opponent(s). More
properly, the process described by Wallace is a
‘mutual military buildup’ rather than an ’arms
race’ per se. A determination of the latter must
await the completion of a more sensitive test of
military spending decisions.
Beyond the absence of definitional rigor, the
mutuality of rapid spending increases cannot
necessarily be deduced from Wallace’s arms
race index. By multiplying the products of each
side’s cardinal spline estimate of military
spending, a unilateral buildup by one side
might be defined as an arms race. For ex-
ample, if country A had a score of 100 (high)
and country B had a score of 1 (low), the net
index would be 100 and the situation classified
as a Wallace arms race. Clearly, this instance is
neither a mutual military buildup nor an arms
race in any reasonable definition of the two
terms.
Wallace also chooses a seemingly arbitrary
threshold of a 90.00 index score to distinguish
between arms races and their absence. No
justification is presented and experimentation
with alternative thresholds is not evident.
Wallace’s conclusions are substantially
weakened if the threshold is lowered to 50.00.
Then, ten additional cases would be contrary
to the escalation model, while its strength
would not be enhanced by even a single case.
While Wallace’s striking findings have
dominated this topic area over the past few
years, it seems that criticisms associated
with his work are sufficient to warrant a
re-examination of the relationship between
rapid military buildups and war.
A re-evaluation
In retesting Wallace’s conclusions, a number
of modifications are made. The temporal
domain is extended five years, now 1816-1970,
to reflect the most complete listing of COW
serious disputes. Since Wallace used only a
preliminary draft of this same compilation, the
dispute populations are not identical across
studies. The addition of newly discovered
disputes and the correction of coding errors
would suggest that the set of cases used by this
replication attempt is more accurate than that
employed by Wallace.
Each serious dispute is treated as an inte-
grated whole (non-dyadically) as is consistent
with the original COW coding scheme. For
example, the dispute leading to the outbreak
of the Crimean War is coded: Russia v. Great
Britain and France. Where it was clear that
partnerships existed and the partners were
inexorably tied up in the disposition of the
dispute, it seems reasonable to consider allies
together rather than separately in the dyadic
scheme. Surely, the military calculus of the
opposing side must consider the joint actions
of those partners. Moreover, good scientific
practice requires that findings should be
reanalyzed under the most conservative, yet
reasonable, set of cases. If Wallace’s results
are conclusive, they should be able to be
reproduced under the conditions outlined
here.
Certain factors dictated that some of the
cases be eliminated from the study. Any
dispute which was related to an ongoing
major power war was dropped from the
population.3 As discussed above in the critique
of Wallace, the escalatory effects of the ongoing
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war are indistinguishable from those of arms
increases. To include those cases might yield
a false indication of the real effects military
buildups have on the initiation of war.
It is all but impossible to accurately estimate
war-time military expenditures for a nation
whose whole economy is devoted to the war
effort. Accordingly, COW treats expenditures
during the two World Wars as missing data.
Due to this data limitation and the nature
of the arms race indicator, cases independent
of ongoing wars from 1915-1920 and 1940-
1947 are necessarily eliminated.4 Idiosyncrasies
in the data set resulted in the elimination of
another caste. 5 Overall, the analysis here
considers 86 separate disputes.6 6
A measure of mutual arms buildup must
reflect significant military increases for both
sides in a dispute and yet be able to detect
instances where only a unilateral buildup is
present. In addition, an appropriate threshold
point must be chosen to differentiate between
incremental spending patterns and those which
are abnormally high. These two considerations
were judged to be lacking in the original
Wallace article.
With this in mind, an index of military
growth for each side in a dispute will be
constructed from the newly revised COW
file on military expenditures (an earlier
version was used by Wallace in his work).
This index is the mean rate of change in
military expenditures (expressed in common
currency and controlled for price fluctuations)
for each side in the three years prior to the
initiation of the disputes 7
Only expenditures prior to the initiation of
the dispute are analyzed. This precludes
consideration of military spending which
was reactive to the dispute itself. In this
way, the index is able to isolate the effects
of an arms buildup from the bias of dispute-
induced spending. Dispute spending patterns
tend to reflect significant spending increases
whether war results or not. This is not sur-
prising as nations seek to ensure security in
a crisis situation.
Furthermore, the index measures only
spending trends in the immediate past of the
dispute. Military expenditures tend to show
greater variation as one moves farther back
in a time-series. Too often, studying a time
period of five or ten years will cause an
overlap into a war period or time frame in
which other disputes influenced expenditure
patterns. Focusing on the three years prior
to the dispute allows consideration of behavior
which is more perceptually important than
comparable spending decisions ten years
before. Rapid changes in military expenditures
are warning signals not only for peace
researchers, but are perhaps one of the
indicators used by foreign policy elites to
ascertain a large scale military buildup by
an opponent.
In this study, I have chosen to designate
any instance of both dispute sides increasing
their military expenditures at a rate of 8%
or greater for the three years before the
dispute as a ’mutual military buildup’. This
threshold was chosen because it most perfectly
captured the dividing line between incremental
increases in military outlays and abnormal
spending increases. This coding decision allows
the World War I dispute to be classified as
a mutual military buildup as is the concerted
opinion of most historians. In no case,
however, are both sides in such a buildup
below a 1007o threshold often cited as an
indicator of high level military spending
increases.8 8
The operational definitions of a ’major
power’, ’serious dispute’, and ’war’ developed
by Singer & Small (1972) and used by Wallace
are retained in this study.
Table II
Mutual military buildup and escalation
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Results
The determination of a mutual military
buildup or its absence for each dispute was
combined with the outcome of that dispute
and the aggregated results are presented
in Table II.
No meaningful covariation exists here
between mutual military buildups and dispute
escalation. Only 25 % of the disputes which
were preceded by a mutual military buildup
escalated to war, while almost 7707o of the
major power wars constituting this sample
population were preceded by periods in which
there was no incidence of joint and rapid
spending increases by the protagonists.
Of the three disputes which fit the escalation
hypothesis, one is World War I and the
other two led to the Second World War.
However, even these cases raise questions
about the impact of mutual arms buildup
on the outbreak of war. There were five
other disputes prior to World War II which
were preceded by this type of buildup and
yet did not escalate to war. This suggests
that the cases which support the escalation
model might only be the product of a spurious
association.
Overall, it appears that most serious
disputes do not involve previous dual military
spending increases and most serious disputes
do not escalate to war; but there does not
seem to be any connection between these
facts. The Yule’s Q value is .36 indicating
a much weaker positive relationship than
Wallace reported. However, the more con-
servative 0 coefficient is only .11 and the
Chi-square value is not significant at any
meaningful level.
It is possible that this analysis, aggregated
over a two-century period, may hide a relation-
ship that is present in only a portion of
this time period. Other scholars have noted
inter-century differences in studying inter-
national conflict. Therefore, the results were
disaggregated, divided into 19th and 20th
groups and the hypothesis retested. The
findings were quite similar to the original
results. Although the association was stronger
in the 20th century, neither relationship
was significant at the .10 level.9 It is also
important to consider the effect of an uni-
lateral arms buildup on the outbreak of war.
It may be that the absence of mutuality
in arms increases causes one side or the other
to consider war a more viable means of
competition. In testing this possibility, cases
in which there was no mutual military
buildup are considered (N = 74). The pro-
position that a unilateral buildup (constituting
a 10% or more increase in military ex-
penditures by one and only one side using
the same index construction as before) affects
the probability of a dispute escalating to
war is considered in Table III.
There seems to be no basis for concluding
that a unilateral military buildup prior to a
dispute increases the chances of war. A Yule’s
Q value of -.35 suggests a possible negative
association between unilateral buildups and
war but the Chi-square value indicates that
the association is not statistically significant.
Towards a convergence of findings
The findings presented here are quite contrary
to Wallace (1979). This lends itself to a
number of possible explanations. Immediately
the differences in arms indices come to mind.
However, Wallace’s cardinal spline function
is heavily weighted toward changes in military
expenditures in the three or four years prior
to the dispute, much as the index used in
this study. In applying the Wallace measure
Table 111
Unilateral buildup and escalation*
* Table includes only those cases which fail to meet the criteria for a mutual military buildup.
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to the data set used in this study, similar
findings can be reported where coding rules
between the studies were not in conflict. Where
differences did exist, the variation can be
explained by reference to other factors beside
index construction. Thus, I conclude that the
differences in findings are not attributable
to differences in the military spending indices.
Another hypothesis is that differences
between the two studies’ data sets led to
divergent findings. Wallace’s list of disputes
was only in its early stages of completion
when his article first appeared. The population
of serious disputes used in this replication
attempt represents a more recent and complete
version of that list. In comparing the two
versions (prior to any coding decisons), the
disparities do not seem to be extraordinary,
at least not to suggest radically different
conclusions. The newer data set includes a
few more cases of pre-World War II disputes
which were preceded by dual arms increases
but did not escalate to war. The Korean
War, actually preceded by spending cutbacks,
is another instance of a dispute not covered
by Wallace. Most of the other changes in
the new file are additions or deletions of
’no buildup-no war’ disputes. As a whole,
the empirical validity of the escalation
hypothesis is weakened when tested with the
updated file, but the changes alone are in-
sufficient to reject Wallace’s conclusions.
Beyond simple changes in the number of
cases, the new file contains some corrections.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 had its
dispute beginning in 1903 according to the latest
file. This is an update from the Wallace
report that the dispute began in 1904. Wallace
considers spending increases in this dispute
through the actual first year of the dispute
(1903). It is not surprising then that he con-
cludes that an arms race took place before the
war. However, according to the corrected
files, one might infer that spending in 1903
was reactive to the dispute and that the
Wallace index would yield a false indication
of prior military competition. Looking only
at military spending patterns prior to the
beginning of the dispute (pre-1903), this study
finds no significant joint arms increases
occurring.
Differences in military expenditure figures
might account for opposite conclusions in a
few cases. Wallace replaced some interpolated
data points with his own estimates of military
appropriations. This may explain why dif-
ferent results are obtained in the 1866 dispute/
war between Germany, Italy and Austria.lo
While revision of research files is to some
degree a continuing process, it is presumed
(pending comparison) that the data used in
this study are more complete and accurate
than previous compilations.
Most of the remaining conflict in the aggre-
gate findings of the two studies can be traced
to differences in coding procedures. Ten
cases which were not independent of ongoing
wars, yet exhibited covariation of spending
increases and escalation, were eliminated in
this study. In addition, the non-dyadic coding
method used here resulted in the collapse of
ten cases, which fit the escalation hypothesis,
into three integrated disputes. In each case,
the two World Wars account for almost all
the instances. In effect, the strength of the
arms race-war relationship cited by Wallace
rests heavily on the two World Wars. The
relationship seems absent in any other cir-
cumstance and gains statistical significance
only through an artificial division of an
integrated situation.
Conclusions
This study retested Wallace’s (1979) findings
that a mutual military buildup between major
powers increased the probability of a serious
dispute escalating to war. Using a modified
set of assumptions and indicators, it was
discovered that only one-fourth of the disputes
preceded by mutual military buildups resulted
in war, while ten of thirteen wars occurred
in the absence of joint arms increases by the
dispute participants. Therefore, it was con-
cluded that mutual military buildups did not
exercise any general impact on the initiation
of war under the limited conditions studied.
This lack of a relationship between military
spending and dispute escalation remained
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unchanged when controls were instituted for
inter-century differences and when retested
to ascertain the influence of a unilateral
military buildup.
In considering the differences in findings
between this study and Wallace’s work, the
importance of assumptions, coding decisions
and data manipulation techniques in empirical
research should be highlighted. Apparently
insignificant research choices can collectively
influence results in a profound way. We owe
it to our colleagues and those in policymaking
circles to be explicit and reveal all relevant
information that impinges on the conduct of
the study. This is not to imply that academics
should retreat to merely debating semantics
or methodological approaches. Rather, it
means we must give greater attention to
the research design of a study and consider
the study and its utility in light of the validity
of that design. The operative message is that
creativity and rigor must coexist in research.
Neither is a substitute for the other.
This paper does not in any way lay to rest
the debate over the danger of rapid military
spending increases. What is apparent,
however, is that they do not constitute an
explanation by themselves for the escalation
of disputes. Future research should expand
the scope of past studies to consider arms
buildups in their contexts of the national
attributes of the participants as well as the
systemic conditions prevailing at that point
in time. There is also a need to study outcomes
of military buildups beyond those which end
in war. Incidences of compromise and
capitulation resulting from arms acquisition
may be just as significant as war outcomes.
The relative mix of mutual and self-stimulatory
processes driving each nation’s spending
increases may be an important key in pre-
dicting those outcomes.
A careful examination of the relationship
of the arms races and war might yet provide
guidance to foreign policy elites, such that
at a minimum, those decision makers can
avoid mistakes which could have unintended
but disastrous consequences.
NOTES
1. The number of separate wars in that study is
variable, depending on how the analyst would
treat the interrelationship of the European and
Pacific theatres in World War II.
2. In cases which involved war-time disputes,
Wallace studied the disputant’s military expenditures
in the nearest pre-war year instead of the year
before the dispute.
3. The cases dropped are mainly those which
occurred after the outbreak of World War I and
World War II. Other cases eliminated were those
associated with the Crimean War, and the 1866
war involving Germany, Italy and Austria. The
Russo-Japanese conflicts in the 1930s are included
as both temporally preceded the Polish crisis and
were distinct from tensions in Europe and elsewhere
in Asia.
4. The most notable absence necessitated by data
unavailability is the U.S.-Japan dispute of 1941.
Unlike other disputes surrounding the World War
II, this dispute could justifiably be considered
separate from the European War. There was also
missing data for one side in two disputes: U.S.S.R.-
Great Britain in 1923 and the dispute over Korea
in 1950. However, calculation of a military buildup
index for the side for which data was available
indicated an absence of a mutual military buildup
according to the criteria used in this study.
Consequently, these cases remain included in the
analysis. In addition, a 1948 dispute involving
the Soviet Union and the three Allied Powers
was not excluded despite the inclusion of only
two (instead of three) years of military expenditure
data in the military buildup indicator. Missing
data for the war year 1945 were responsible for
this alteration.
5. The dispute between France and Italy in 1860
is not considered. Prior to the dispute, Italy’s
military expenditures were coded as those only
of Sardinia. With the advent of Italian unification,
expenditure figures were derived from all of Italy.
Consequently, an artificial jump in military spending
occurs in the data set. This changeover occurs in
one of the years under study for this case and to
avoid misconceptions, this dispute is eliminated
from the sample.
6. Some wars which resulted from a major power
serious dispute, but did not involve major power
participation on both sides are included in this
study. These are: the 1863 war between Denmark
on one side and Germany and Austria on the other;
Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1934; and the
Sino-Indian border war of 1962.
7. The formula for the index is:
% &Delta; (Mt-2 &rarr; Mt-1) + % &Delta; (Mt-3 &rarr; Mt-2)/
where t is the year of the dispute and M = m1 + m2
... mk;
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where mi represents the military expenditures of
a major power on that side of the dispute.
8. Experimentation with other thresholds did not
significantly affect the results reported here.
9. The &empty; value for the 19th Century war .08 and
Chi-square was a paltry .198. The 20th Century
yielded a &empty; of .18 and a Chi-square value of 1.79.
10. These manipulations are not apparent in any of
the Wallace articles. The disclosure of these
transformations was graciously made to me in a
personal conversation with Professor Wallace.
However, analysis of the extent and validity of
these changes cannot be assessed without a copy
of the Wallace data base. Professor Wallace is
attempting to reconstruct that file and results as
of this writing are incomplete.
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